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Insane Delusions---Phenomena Affecting
Testamentary Capacity in the
Execution of Wills
By JosEPH IP. GUADNoLA.
When common sense directs us to conform to the dictates of conscience, the results of our deliberations are incontestible. Without common sense we act unconsciously,

as it were, and consequently our performances may be subject to litigation. Thus we may commence by saying that
soundness of the mental faculties is indispensable in the
execution of a valid will. We are not now treating wills
merely as tangible documents but, technically, and in the
legal sense, we are treating them as meaning "all the words,
signs, and symbols, which the testator has issued and has left
unrevoked to indicate what shall be done concerning his
property and affairs after his death." 1 An essential element
of testamentary capacity is that the testator have a "disposing mind" 2 at the time he executes his will. Roughly
speaking, testamentary capacity is destroyed in cases of
complete insanity. There are cases, however, where a person may not be completely insane and yet be dispossessed
of a disposing mind at the requisite time. Such cases are
very frequently grounded on delusional insanity, or that
type of mental condition which is generally referred to as
the insane delusion.
A person is possessed of an insane delusion when he
stubbornly believes certain facts to exist which really have
no existence or even a reasonable foundation. He persists
in believing these facts regardless of evidence to disprove
them and of the existence of contrary facts which fashion his
1 VI American Law and Procedure 33.
2 In Hall v. Perry, 87 Me. 569, 572, 33 A. 160, 47 Am. St. Rep. 572, Whitehouse J., in
speaking of' a disposing mind states that one must have "sufficient capacity to
comprehend the condition of his property, his relations to the persons who were or
should have been the objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions in his will." See Costigan Cases on Property 5 (Wills-2d.Ed.). page 21 in
the footnote. See, also, Speirer v. Curtis, 143 N.E. 427, 312 Ill. 152; Needham
Trust Co. v. Cookson, 251 Mass. 160, 146 N.E. 268; Forberg v. Maurer, 336 II.
192. 168 N.E. 308 (1929). Testator has "mental capacity" to execute will if he
can comprehend natural objects of bounty, kind of property, and make disposition
thereof under plan he formed. Flanigon v. Smith, 337 Ill. 572, 169 N.E. 767
(March 1930). See, also, In re Bayer's Estate, 227 N.W. 928 (Nebraska, 1930).
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beliefs into an apparent absurdity. The belief may be in
something impossible in the nature of things or impossible
under the circumstances surrounding the victim." But in
order for the notions of the testator to constitute an insane
delusion they must be a product of the imagination, without
any sort of evidence to support them. A belief which may
be unfounded, unreasonable, or extravagant does not constitute an insane delusion if it is based upon any evidence,
however slight. 4 Such notions may be said to be deduced
from facts and thus they may be properly classed with conclusions. This point is clearly illustrated in Smith v. Smith, "
where it was claimed, in proceedings to set aside a will, that
the unsoundness of mind of the testator was manifested by
his search for gold and coal on his farm, and that his belief
that gold could be found in paying quantities was a delusion
resulting from an unsound state of mind. But it appeared
that the notions which the testator had concerning the probability of finding gold and coal were not purely imaginative
but had same basis in fact. Consequently the court held
that such ideas of the testator were conclusions, and not
delusions as it was claimed. A misapprehension of a fact
is not necessarily a delusion, at least of sufficient bearing to
invalidate a will. The testator's beliefs may not be well
founded. They may be disbelieved by other persons. Yet
he may have actual grounds for suspicion of the existence
of that something in which he so persistently believes. In
such a case the alleged beliefs justly deserve sufficient consideration and investigation. And so, if, under the facts of
a case, a court is able to understand how a person, in a situation similar to the person alleged to be afflicted with an insane delusion, might have believed as the evidence shows he
believed, and still have enjoyed the' full possession of his
senses, then it may be rightly said that the case does not
establish the existence of an insane delusion.
The influence which insane delusions have on testamentary disposition is generally of a serious nature. In order
to show that testamentary disposition has been affected by
insane delusions it must appear that the testator's delusions
3 Farmer v. Davis, 289 Ill. 392, 124 N.E. 640 (1919).
4 Schweitzer v. Bean. 154 Ark. 228, 242 S.W. 63 (1922).
5 205 I1. App. 116 (1917).

-
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in some manner entered into the making of his will. The
holding of delusions does not of itself constitute testamentary incapacity but affects testamentary capacity only when
it enters into or controls in some degree its exercise. 6 And
delusions not influencing the will do not affect its validity.7
The reason for this rule is that the testator's mental capacity
at the time of the execution of his will determines the validity of the instrument.' Thus a person may be laboring under
an insane delusion subsequent to the making of his will and
the delusion may even move him to make the will, yet if it
does not influence or control him in the disposition of his
property his testamentary capacity will not be destroyed. 9
Under such a state of facts it would be difficult to prove that
when he executed the will his testamentary capacity was
materially affected, and ordinarily in the absence of influence
while making his will the testator's judgment in the disposition of his property is free from serious consequences.
The different forms which insane delusions assume are
manifold. For present purposes simply a few of the most
common specific examples will be treated.'
One of these
forms is a dislike for natural objects of the testator's bounty.
In many instances testator believes that such persons have
been guilty of misconduct, (this belief only to be proved
erroneous when the will is brought for probate). Whether
not such a belief should amount to an insane delusion is to
be determined by evidence." It may amount to an insane
delusion if it is not based on evidence and cannot be removed
by evidence.' 2 Another form to which this test may be applied is where the testator wrongly believes that the natural
objects of his bounty or those who should have been the
natural objects of his bounty have been hostile to him.
An unfortunate situation arises when in the execution
6 In re Sturdevant's Estate, 92 Oregon 269, 180 Pac. 595 (1919); In re Heaton's Will,
224 N. Y. 22, 120 N.E. 83 (1918).
7 Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. of Shamokin v. Heidenreich, 290 Pa. 249, 138
AtL 764 (1927).
8 Jenkins v. Trice, 147 S.E. 251 (Virginia, 1929); Pickens v. Wisman, 145 S.E. 177
(West Va., 1928); Dersis v. Dersis, 210 Ala. 308, 98 So. 27 (1923); In re Perkin'e
Estate, 195 Cal. 699, 235 Pac. 45 (1925); In re Shield's Estate, 198 Iowa 686,
200 N.W. 219 (1924): In re Wah-kon-tah-he-um-pah's Estate, 109 Okla. 126, 284
Pac. 210 (1925); In re Wegner's Estate, 185 Wis. 407, 201 N.W. 826 (1925).
9 Spry v. Logansport Loan & Trust Co., 191 Ind. 522, 133 N.E. 827 (1922).
10 For a discussion of specific examples of insane delusions see Vol. 1 Page on Wills
(2d. Ed.) §155.
11 For tests based on evidence see Vol. 1. Page on Wills (2d Ed.) §153, §154, "Analysip
of Insane Delusion."
12 Hardenburg v. Hardenburg, 133 Iowa 1, 109 N.W. 1014.
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of his will testator disinherits his children because he believes that they are not his own, relying upon the persistent
belief that his wife had been unfaithful to him.' 3 However,
if there is the least indication that evidence exists upon which
to base this belief it cannot be deemed an insane delusion.
But, where testator disinherited his daughter after he had
left his wife for many years after their marriage, declaring
that he had left her because of her infidelity, it was held that
this belief was an insane delusion in the absence of direct
evidence to substantiate it. 14 It has been held that a will is

not invalid, for mental incompetency of the testator, merely
because he believed that the contestant was not his son, in
spite of the fact that for years he had treated and recognized
him as his own son." And in Farmerv. Davis, 6 where the
testator distributed his property unequally among the natural objects of his bounty, because of prejudice or unfriendliness toward some and affection or friendship toward
others, this did not establish that he labored under an insane
delusion towards relatives as to whom slight or no provision
was made. A case on record 7 shows that a testatrix, when
executing her will leaving the bulk of her estate to one of
her two nieces, was laboring under an insane delusion that
the other niece was guilty of theft from her, and for that
reason excluded her from the will, but it was held that the
will cannot be sustained. A grave difficulty presented by
most cases of this nature is that the person who made the
will, being dead at the time of probation, may have had some
basis for his belief which is inevitably unknown to the court.
It necessarily follows that insane delusions are often held
to exist whereas in reality the testator could possibly have
presented -evidence of a rational nature as the basis of his
beliefs.
13 Buford v.

Gruber, 223 Mo. 231, 122 S.W. 717: Haines v. Hayden, 95 Mich. 332, 54

N.W. 911; In re Shank's Will. 172 Wis. 621, 179 N.W. 747.
14 In re Russell's Estate, 189 Cal. 759, 210 Pac. 249. This case also points out a distinction between "delusion" and "insane delusion"; "a 'delusion' being a fixed belief
that a theory is true which is not true or not true in the manner in which it is
believed, and an 'insane delusion' being such a belief entertained without any basis
in reason or evidence, and adhered to against reason and evidnce." See, also, In
re Struve's Estate, 279 Pac. 846 (Calif., 1929).
15 Miller v. Weston, 67 Colo. 534, 189 Pac. 610 (1920). As to how a testator's partial
mental derangement toward a particular person might prevent a gift to such per-

son, and yet not invalidate the will, see. Stackhouse v. Horton 15 N. J. Eq. 202, 225.
In connection with this case, see, Rood on Wills (2d Ed.) §135.
16 289 Ill. 392, 124 N.E. 640.
17 Power v. Overholt, 257 Pa. 254, 101 Ati. 733 (1917).

•rE

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

It is interesting, in discussing this subject, to note the
manner in which a belief in Spiritualism will often times.
affect the testator's testamentary capacity. When the validity of a will is attacked on the ground that the testator believed in communications with the spirits of the dead, the
question may arise as to whether the testator when he executed his will was insane or whether the will was executed
in consequence of undue influence. Generally a belief in
Spiritualism is not held to be an insane delusion."8 But a
person may believe to such an extent as to destroy his testamentary capacity. A person may think continually and
persistently upon supposed communications, become a monomaniac, lose his power of reasoning properly on the subject
and execute an invalid will.1 So while a belief in Spiritualism is not insanity, an actual monomania about Spiritualism
will avoid a will, 20 if it causes the testator to make a different

disposition of his property- than he would otherwise have
made. In Bagwvell v. Shanks2 ' it was held that when a person at the time of making a will is the victim of a delusion
that she is in communication with and is guided and controlled by spirits, such delusion does not affect the validity
of the will unless it influences her to make a disposition difbeliefs shall constitute insane delusions in the legal sense or
in the medical sense, there is some dispute. It has been held
that ability to make a will depends upon testamentary capacity and soundness of mind as defined by law, and not

on medical soundness of mind.2 3 It re Russell's Estate24
held that proof of insanity in a medical sense is insufficient.
It was stated in that case that there must be "either such a
complete mental degeneration as denotes utter incapacity
to know and understand those things which the law preferent from what she would otherwise make. However, belief in Spiritualism in the execution, of wills is largely a
problem of undue influence.-- For the purpose of this dis18 For a discussion on this point see Gardner on Wills §42. See, also, 63 Am. St. Rep.
72, in the note, page 93.
19 Orchardson v. Cofield, 171 I11.
14, 49 N.E. 197, 40 L.R.A. 256. 63 Am. St. Rep. 211.
20 O'Dell v. Goff, 149 Mich., 152, 112 N.W. 736. See notes, 15 L.R.A. (X.S.) 674.
21 260 S.W. 222 (Texas, 1924).
23 In re Tymeson's Will. 187 N.Y.S. 330, 114 Mis. Rep. 643.
24 189 Cal. 759, 210 Pac. 249 (1922). See Costigan Cases on Property 5. (Wills-2d).
notes pp. 28, 29.
22 Want of testamentary capacity and undue influence are distinct grounds on which a
will may be impeached, since one may be competent to make a will and yet under
such constraint as to vitiate the instrument executed. In re Bossom's Will, 186
- N.Y.S. 782, 195 App. Div. 339.
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cussion it is sufficient to say, in regard to this belief, that the
courts seem to be unanimous in their decisions that a belief
in Spiritualism is not in itself evidence of testamentary incapacity, if the testator, in making his will, is in no way influenced by his peculiar belief.
In regard to the question as to whether or not particular
scribes as essential, or a specific insane delusion which affected the making of the will." This presents a nice problem
for discussion. In declaring that it is fallacious to say that
a person is not suffering from an insane delusion because
he does not, from a legal standard, conduct himself rationally in reference to his persistent beliefs, Wilbur, J., in the
case of In re Allen's Estate" said: " . . . Insanity is one

of the least understood of the ailments which afflict humanity. It is a fertile field for investigation, and happily is receiving that investigation at this time. If the legal definition
of an insane delusion can be upheld at all on principle, it is
because of the fact that the courts regard other forms of
insane delusions, or of mental disease, as too difficult of
proof as a basis for decisions by courts and juries. In that
view, and in that view only, do I think that a legal definition
of an insane delusion can be upheld on principle, and even
in that case we ought not to close the door to such developments of modern research as may be able to make more
certain proof of insanity."
To view the principles involved in this subject dimly,
but not inaccurately, it is observed that insane delusions and
testamentary capacity may coexist. These delusions may
not affect testamentary capacity and then again they may
destroy it. If a testamentary disposition is made under the
influence of an insane delusion, and reason and judgment
are lacking, then the necessary testamentary power is lost,
and consequently a will executed under those conditions
should be declared void. But simply because the mind is
subject to some delusion, it does not necessarily follow that
the testator should be deemed not to possess testamentary
capacity to dispose of his property, for the reason that the
delusion may not exercise any influence whatever on the disposition and the will may be perfectly rational. Unless testa25 177 C 1. 668, 171 Pae. 686 (1918).

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

tor's dispositions of property in his will are connected in
some way with his insane delusions such dispositions must
be treated as valid, and the execution of his will judged as
if he were sane. However, it is most important to observe
that where the testamentary disposition is manifestly the
fruit of an insane delusion such disposition must be regarded
as being affected the same as if the testator were totally
insane.
And so the affect of these phenomena on the execution
of wills very generally gives rise to sad circumstances when
the administration of justice has been had. True, the decisions of our courts are not infrequently met with disfavor
on this subject, and perhaps justly so in many casesi-but
nevertheless, the doctrines governing this matter must be
strictly interpreted for the protection of the law of wills.
In view of this principle, it is only in the case of a rationally
executed will that the unfortunate consequences of probation may be avoided.

